Reading a Book Uses the _____ System of the Dual Process Theory.

Psychological theory of how idea can arise in 2 different means

In psychology, a dual process theory provides an account of how idea can arise in two dissimilar ways, or as a result of two different processes. Often, the two processes consist of an implicit (automated), unconscious process and an explicit (controlled), conscious procedure. Verbalized explicit processes or attitudes and deportment may change with persuasion or education; though implicit procedure or attitudes usually accept a long corporeality of time to alter with the forming of new habits. Dual process theories can be found in social, personality, cerebral, and clinical psychology. Information technology has also been linked with economics via prospect theory and behavioral economics, and increasingly in sociology through cultural analysis.^{[one] [2]}

History [edit]

The foundations of dual process theory likely comes from William James. He believed that at that place were two dissimilar kinds of thinking: associative and truthful reasoning. James theorized that empirical thought was used for things like art and design work. For James, images and thoughts would come to mind of past experiences, providing ideas of comparison or abstractions. He claimed that associative noesis was merely from by experiences describing information technology as "simply reproductive". James believed that truthful reasoning could enable overcoming "unprecedented situations" simply as a map could enable navigating past obstacles.

In that location are various dual process theories that were produced after William James's work. Dual process models are very common in the report of social psychological variables, such every bit attitude change. Examples include Fiddling and Cacioppo's elaboration likelihood model (explained beneath) and Chaiken's heuristic systematic model. Co-ordinate to these models, persuasion may occur later on either intense scrutiny or extremely superficial thinking. In cognitive psychology, attention and working memory have also been conceptualized as relying on two singled-out processes.^[3] Whether the focus be on social psychology or cognitive psychology, there are many examples of dual process theories produced throughout the past. The following merely testify a glimpse into the variety that can be found.

Peter Wason and Jonathan Evans suggested dual procedure theory in 1974.^[4] In Evans' afterward theory, at that place are two distinct types of processes: heuristic processes and analytic processes. He suggested that during heuristic processes, an individual chooses which information is relevant to the current situation. Relevant information is then processed further whereas irrelevant information is not. Following the heuristic processes come analytic processes. During analytic processes, the relevant information that is called during the heuristic processes is then used to make judgments nigh the state of affairs.^[5]

Richard East. Footling and John Cacioppo proposed a dual process theory focused in the field of social psychology in 1986. Their theory is called the elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. In their theory, at that place are 2 different routes to persuasion in making decisions. The offset road is known as the central route and this takes place when a person is thinking advisedly most a situation, elaborating on the information they are given, and creating an argument. This route occurs when an private's motivation and ability are high. The second route is known equally the peripheral route and this takes place when a person is not thinking carefully about a state of affairs and uses shortcuts to brand judgments. This road occurs when an private's motivation or ability are low.^[6]

Steven Sloman produced some other interpretation on dual processing in 1996. He believed that associative reasoning takes stimuli and divides it into logical clusters of information based on statistical regularity. He proposed that how you associate is direct proportional to the similarity of past experiences, relying on temporal and similarity relations to determine reasoning rather than an underlying mechanical structure. The other reasoning procedure in Sloman'south opinion was of the Rule-based system. The organization functioned on logical construction and variables based upon rule systems to come to conclusions different from that of the associative system. He also believed that the Rule-based system had control over the associative organization, though information technology could but suppress it.^[7] This estimation corresponds well to earlier work on computational models of dual processes of reasoning.^[8]

Daniel Kahneman provided further interpretation by differentiating the 2 styles of processing more, calling them intuition and reasoning in 2003. Intuition (or organization i), like to associative reasoning, was determined to be fast and automatic, usually with strong emotional bonds included in the reasoning procedure. Kahneman said that this kind of reasoning was based on formed habits and very hard to alter or manipulate. Reasoning (or system 2) was slower and much more volatile, beingness subject to conscious judgments and attitudes.^[nine]

Fritz Strack and Roland Deutsch proposed some other dual process theory focused in the field of social psychology in 2004. Co-ordinate to their model, there are 2 separate systems: the reflective arrangement and the impulsive organization. In the cogitating organisation, decisions are made using cognition and the information that is coming in from the state of affairs is processed. On the other hand, in the impulsive arrangement, decisions are made using schemes and in that location is niggling or no thought required.^[10]

Theories [edit]

Dual procedure learning model [edit]

Ron Sun proposed a dual-process model of learning (both implicit learning and explicit learning). The model (named CLARION) re-interpreted voluminous behavioral data in psychological studies of implicit learning and skill acquisition in general. The resulting theory is ii-level and interactive, based on the thought of the interaction of one-shot explicit dominion learning (i.due east., explicit learning) and gradual implicit tuning through reinforcement (i.e. implicit learning), and it accounts for many previously unexplained cerebral information and phenomena based on the interaction of implicit and explicit learning.^[11]

The Dual Procedure Learning model can be applied to a group-learning environment. This is called The Dual Objective Model of Cooperative Learning and information technology requires a group practice that consists of both cognitive and melancholia skills amidst the squad.^[12] Information technology involves agile participation by the teacher to monitor the group throughout its entirety until the product has been successfully completed.^[12] The instructor focuses on the effectiveness of cognitive and affective practices inside the group'due south cooperative learning surround. The instructor acts equally an aide to the group by encouraging their positive affective behavior and ideas. In addition, the teacher remains, continually watching for improvement in the group's development of the product and interactions amongst the students. The teacher volition interject to give feedback on means the students can better contribute affectively or cognitively to the grouping equally a whole. The goal is to foster a sense of customs amid the group while creating a good product that is a culmination of each student's unique ideas.^[12]

Dual coding [edit]

Using a somewhat unlike approach, Allan Paivio has developed a dual-coding theory of information processing. Co-ordinate to this model, cognition involves the coordinated activeness of two independent, just continued systems, a nonverbal organization and a verbal system that is specialized to bargain with language. The nonverbal organisation is hypothesized to have developed earlier in evolution. Both systems rely on unlike areas of the brain. Paivio has reported testify that nonverbal, visual images are processed more efficiently and are approximately twice as memorable. Additionally, the verbal and nonverbal systems are additive, and so one can better memory by using both types of information during learning.^[13]

Dual-process accounts of reasoning [edit]

Background [edit]

Dual-process accounts of reasoning postulate that in that location are two systems or minds in i brain. A current theory is that there are two cerebral systems underlying thinking and reasoning and that these different systems were developed through development.^[14] These systems are often referred to equally "implicit" and "explicit" or by the more neutral "System 1" and "Organisation two", every bit coined by Keith Stanovich and Richard West.^[15]

The systems have multiple names by which they tin be called, as well as many different properties.

System 1 [edit]

John Bargh reconceptualized the notion of an automatic process by breaking down the term "automated" into iv components: awareness, intentionality, efficiency, and controllability. I style for a process to be labeled as automated is for the person to exist unaware of information technology. There are three ways in which a person may be unaware of a mental process: they can be unaware of the presence of the stimulus (subliminal), how the stimulus is categorized or interpreted (unaware of the activation of stereotype or trait constructs), or the effect the stimulus has on the person's judgments or actions (misattribution). Another manner for a mental procedure to be labeled as automatic is for it to exist unintentional. Intentionality refers to the witting "offset upwardly" of a process. An automatic process may begin without the person consciously willing it to start. The 3rd component of automaticity is efficiency. Efficiency refers to the amount of cerebral resource required for a process. An automatic process is efficient because it requires few resource. The 4th component is controllability, referring to the person's conscious ability to stop a process. An automated process is uncontrollable, significant that the process will run until completion and the person will not be able to stop it. Bargh conceptualized automaticity equally a component view (any combination awareness, intention, efficiency, and control) as opposed to the historical concept of automaticity as an all-or-none dichotomy.^[xvi]

1 takeaway from the psychological research on dual process theory is that our Organization i (intuition) is more accurate in areas where nosotros've gathered a lot of information with reliable and fast feedback, like social dynamics.^[17]

Arrangement 2 in humans [edit]

Organisation two is evolutionarily recent and specific to humans. Information technology is too known every bit the explicit system, the rule-based system, the rational organisation,^[fourteen] or the analytic system.^[18] It performs the more tiresome and sequential thinking. Information technology is domain-general, performed in the central working memory system. Considering of this, information technology has a limited chapters and is slower than System ane which correlates it with general intelligence. Information technology is known as the rational system because it reasons co-ordinate to logical standards.^[18] Some overall backdrop associated with Organisation two are that information technology is rule-based, analytic, controlled, demanding of cerebral capacity, and ho-hum.^[14]

[edit]

The dual procedure has impact on social psychology in such domains every bit stereotyping, categorization, and judgment. Especially, the report of automaticity and of implicit in dual procedure theories has the almost influence on a person's perception. People normally perceive other people's data and categorize them by age, gender, race, or role. According to Neuberg and Fiske (1987) a perceiver who receives a practiced amount of information near the target person so volition use their formal mental category (Unconscious) as a basis for judging the person. When the perceiver is distracted, the perceiver has to pay more attending to target information (Witting).^[19] Categorization is the basic procedure of stereotyping in which people are categorized into social groups that have specific stereotypes associated with them.^[20] It is able to retrieve people'due south judgment automatically without subjective intention or effort. Mental attitude tin also be activated spontaneously by the object. John Bargh's study offered an alternative view, property that substantially all attitudes, fifty-fifty weak ones are capable of automatic activation. Whether the attitude is formed automatically or operates with effort and control, it can still bias further processing of information about the object and direct the perceivers' deportment with regard to the target. Co-ordinate to Shelly Chaiken, heuristic processing is the activation and application of judgmental rules and heuristics are presumed to be learned and stored in memory. It is used when people are making accessible decisions such as "experts are e'er right" (system 1) and systematic processing is inactive when individuals brand effortful scrutiny of all the relevant information which requires cerebral thinking (organisation ii).^[21] The heuristic and systematic processing then influence the domain of attitude change and social influence. Unconscious thought theory is the counterintuitive and contested view that the unconscious mind is adapted to highly circuitous decision making. Where near dual system models ascertain circuitous reasoning as the domain of effortful witting thought, UTT argues circuitous bug are best dealt with unconsciously.

Stereotyping [edit]

Dual process models of stereotyping propose that when we perceive an individual, salient stereotypes pertaining to them are activated automatically. These activated representations will then guide behavior if no other motivation or cognition take identify. However, controlled cognitive processes tin can inhibit the employ of stereotypes when there is motivation and cognitive resource to do and so. Devine (1989) provided show for the dual procedure theory of stereotyping in a serial of iii studies. Study one linked found prejudice (co-ordinate to the Modern Racism Scale) was unrelated to knowledge of cultural stereotypes of African Americans. Study 2 showed that subjects used automatically activated stereotypes in judgments regardless of prejudice level (personal belief). Participants were primed with stereotype relevant or not-relevant words and and then asked to give hostility ratings of a target with an unspecified race who was performing ambiguously hostile behaviors. Regardless of prejudice level, participants who were primed with more stereotype-relevant words gave college hostility ratings to the ambiguous target. Study 3 investigated whether people can command stereotype utilize by activating personal beliefs. Depression-prejudice participants asked to list African Americans listed more positive examples than did those high in prejudice.^[22]

Terror management theory and the dual process model [edit]

According to psychologists Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, the dual process model, in relation to terror management theory, identifies two systems by which the brain manages fearfulness of expiry: distal and proximal.^[23] Distal defenses fall nether the organisation 1 category because information technology is unconscious whereas proximal defenses fall under the organization 2 category because it operates with conscious idea. However, recent work by the ManyLabs^[24] project has shown that the bloodshed salience effect (e.g., reflecting on one'due south own death encouraging a greater defense of one'due south ain worldview) has failed to replicate (ManyLabs attempt to replicate a seminal theoretical finding beyond multiple laboratories -- in this case some of these labs included input from the original terror direction theorists.)

Distal defenses	Proximal defenses
Deal with subconscious, abstract ideas of expiry	Deal with conscious thoughts of death at the level of a specific threat
Experiential	Rational
Occur when mortality is not salient	Occur immediately later directly reminder or threat of mortality
Occur in response to subliminal reminders of death	Does not occur after subliminal reminders of expiry
Operate by cocky-conception as a part of a death-transcendent reality (i.e. thinking of oneself as role of a culture that will endure across one's own life).	Operate by pushing thoughts of expiry into the afar future and removing them from conscious idea

Dual procedure and habituation [edit]

Habituation can be described as decreased response to a repeated stimulus. According to Groves and Thompson, the process of habituation too mimics a dual process. The dual process theory of behavioral habituation relies on two underlying (not-behavioral) processes; depression and facilitation with the relative strength of i over the other determining whether or not habituation or sensitization is seen in the behavior. Habituation weakens the intensity of a repeated stimulus over time subconsciously. As a result, a person will give the stimulus less conscious attention over time. Conversely, sensitization subconsciously strengthens a stimulus over time, giving the stimulus more than conscious attention. Though these ii systems are not both conscious, they collaborate to help people sympathize their surroundings by strengthening some stimuli and diminishing others.^[25]

Dual process and steering cognition [edit]

Co-ordinate to Walker, system 1 functions as a serial cognitive steering processor for organisation 2, rather than a parallel system. In big-scale repeated studies with school students, Walker tested how students adjusted their imagined self-operation in different curriculum subjects of maths, scientific discipline and English language. He showed that students consistently adapt the biases of their heuristic self-representation to specific states for the different curriculum subjects.^[26] The model of cerebral steering proposes that, in order to procedure epistemically varied environmental information, a heuristic orientation system is required to align varied, incoming environmental data with existing neural algorithmic processes. The brain'southward associative simulation capacity, centered around the imagination, plays an integrator role to perform this function. Testify for early-stage concept formation and future self-functioning within the hippocampus supports the model,.^{[27] [28]} In the cognitive steering model, a conscious country emerges from effortful associative simulation, required to align novel data accurately with remote memory, via subsequently algorithmic processes. By contrast, fast unconscious automaticity is constituted by unregulated simulatory biases, which induce errors in subsequent algorithmic processes. The phrase 'rubbish in, rubbish out' is used to explain errorful heuristic processing: errors will always occur if the accuracy of initial retrieval and location of data is poorly self-regulated.

Application in economic beliefs [edit]

According to Alos-Ferrer and Strack the dual-process theory has relevance in economical determination-making through the multiple-selves model, in which ane person's self-concept is composed of multiple selves depending on the context. An case of this is someone who as a student is difficult working and intelligent, merely as a sibling is caring and supportive. Conclusion-making involves the use of both automated and controlled processes, but also depends on the person and state of affairs, and given a person's experiences and current state of affairs the decision process may differ. Given that there are two decision processes with differing goals 1 is more likely to be more useful in particular situations. For example, a person is presented with a determination involving a selfish but rational motive and a social motive. Depending on the individual one of the motives volition be more appealing than the other, simply depending on the state of affairs the preference for one motive or the other may change. Using the dual-process theory information technology is important to consider whether one motive is more automated than the other, and in this particular case the automaticity would depend on the individual and their experiences. A selfish person may choose the selfish motive with more automaticity than a non-selfish person, and however a controlled procedure may yet outweigh this based on external factors such as the state of affairs, monetary gains, or societal pressure. Although there is likely to be a stable preference for which motive 1 will select based on the individual it is important to recollect that external factors will influence the decision. Dual process theory also provides a different source of behavioral heterogeneity in economics. It is mostly assumed within economics that this heterogeneity comes from differences in taste and rationality, while dual procedure theory indicates necessary considerations of which processes are automated and how these different processes may interact within determination making.^[29]

Moral Psychology [edit]

Moral judgments are said to be explained in role past dual process theory. In moral dilemmas we are presented united states with two morally unpalatable options. For example, should nosotros sacrifice i life in lodge to save many lives or simply let many lives be lost? Consider a historical example: should we authorize the use of force against other nations in order to forbid "any time to come acts of international terrorism"^[30] or should we take a more pacifist approach to strange lives and chance the possibility of terrorist attack? Dual process theorists have argued that sacrificing something of moral value in gild to preclude a worse issue (ofttimes called the "utilitarian" option) involves more than reflective reasoning than the more pacifist (also known as the "deontological" option).^[31] Notwithstanding, some evidence suggests that this is not e'er the instance,^[32] that reflection can sometimes increase damage-rejection responses,^[33] and that reflection correlates with both the sacrificial and pacifist (but not more than anti-social) responses.^[34] So some have proposed that tendencies toward sacrificing for the greater good or toward pacifism are meliorate explained by factors besides the two processes proposed by dual procedure theorists.^[35]

Evidence [edit]

Belief bias event [edit]

A belief bias is the tendency to judge the force of arguments based on the plausibility of their conclusion rather than how strongly they support that conclusion.^[36] Some bear witness suggests that this bias results from competition between logical (System 2) and belief-based (System 1) processes during evaluation of arguments.

Studies on belief-bias effect were first designed by Jonathan Evans to create a conflict betwixt logical reasoning and prior knowledge virtually the truth of conclusions.^[37] Participants are asked to evaluate syllogisms that are: valid arguments with believable conclusions, valid arguments with unbelievable conclusions, invalid arguments with believable conclusions, and invalid arguments with unbelievable conclusions.^[14] Participants are told to only agree with conclusions that logically follow from the bounds given. The results suggest when the conclusion is conceivable, people erroneously accept invalid conclusions equally valid more frequently than invalid arguments are accustomed which back up unpalatable conclusions. This is taken to suggest that Organisation ane beliefs are interfering with the logic of System 2.^[14]

Tests with working retention [edit]

De Neys^[38] conducted a study that manipulated working retention capacity while answering syllogistic problems. This was washed past burdening executive processes with secondary tasks. Results showed that when System ane triggered the correct response, the distractor task had no result on the production of a right answer which supports the fact that System ane is automatic and works independently of working retention, simply when belief-bias was present (System 1 belief-based response was different from the logically right System 2 response) the participants performance was impeded by the decreased availability of working retention. This falls in accord with the knowledge about Organisation 1 and System 2 of the dual-process accounts of reasoning because System 1 was shown to work independent of working retention, and System 2 was impeded due to a lack of working retentiveness space so System 1 took over which resulted in a belief-bias.^[38]

fMRI studies [edit]

Vinod Goel and others produced neuropsychological evidence for dual-procedure accounts of reasoning using fMRI^[39] studies. They provided evidence that anatomically singled-out parts of the encephalon were responsible for the two different kinds of reasoning. They plant that content-based reasoning acquired left temporal hemisphere activation whereas abstract formal problem reasoning activated the parietal system. They concluded that unlike kinds of reasoning, depending on the semantic content, activated one of two unlike systems in the encephalon.^[39]

A similar study incorporated fMRI during a belief-bias test.^[40] They establish that unlike mental processes were competing for command of the response to the bug given in the belief-bias test. The prefrontal cortex was critical in detecting and resolving conflicts, which are characteristic of System two, and had already been associated with that System 2. The ventral medial prefrontal cortex, known to be associated with the more intuitive or heuristic responses of Arrangement 1, was the area in competition with the prefrontal cortex.^[xl]

About-infrared spectroscopy [edit]

Tsujii and Watanabe^[eighteen] did a follow-up study to Goel and Dolan's^[forty] fMRI experiment. They examined the neural correlates on the junior frontal cortex (IFC) activeness in conventionalities-bias reasoning using near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS). Subjects performed a syllogistic reasoning task, using congruent and incongruent syllogisms, while attending to an attending-demanding secondary task. The involvement of the researchers was in how the secondary-tasks inverse the activity of the IFC during congruent and incongruent reasoning processes. The results showed that the participants performed ameliorate in the congruent exam than in the incongruent test (evidence for conventionalities bias); the high demand secondary examination impaired the incongruent reasoning more than than it impaired the coinciding reasoning. NIRS results showed that the right IFC was activated more during incongruent trials. Participants with enhanced right IFC activity performed ameliorate on the incongruent reasoning than those with decreased correct IFC activity. This study provided some show to enhance the fMRI results that the right IFC, specifically, is critical in resolving alien reasoning, just that it is likewise attention-demanding; its effectiveness decreases with loss of attending. The loss of effectiveness in Arrangement ii post-obit loss of attention makes the automatic heuristic Organisation one take over, which results in conventionalities bias.^[18]

Matching bias [edit]

Matching bias is a non-logical heuristic.^[41] The matching bias is described as a tendency to use lexical content matching of the argument well-nigh which one is reasoning, to be seen equally relevant information and exercise the reverse likewise, ignore relevant data that doesn't lucifer. It mostly affects problems with abstruse content. It doesn't involve prior knowledge and beliefs only it is still seen every bit a System 1 heuristic that competes with the logical Organization 2.^[41]

The Wason selection task provides show for the matching bias.^[14] The test is designed as a measure out of a person's logical thinking power.^[42] Functioning on the Wason Selection Job is sensitive to the content and context with which information technology is presented. If you lot innovate a negative component into the conditional statement of the Wason Choice Task, e.g. 'If at that place is an A one side of the carte du jour then at that place is not a 3 on the other side', in that location is a strong tendency to choose cards that lucifer the items in the negative condition to test, regardless of their logical status. Changing the test to exist a exam of post-obit rules rather than truth and falsity is another status where the participants will ignore the logic because they will just follow the rule, eastward.g. irresolute the test to exist a examination of a law officeholder looking for underaged drinkers.^[41] The original task is more difficult because it requires explicit and abstract logical thought from System 2, and the police officeholder test is cued by relevant prior knowledge from System 1.^[xiv]

Studies have shown that you can train people to inhibit matching bias which provides neuropsychological bear witness for the dual-process theory of reasoning.^[14] When you compare trials before and after the training in that location is testify for a forward shift in activated brain area. Pre-test results showed activation in locations along the ventral pathway and post-test results showed activation around the ventro-medial prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate.^[43] Matching bias has also been shown to generalise to syllogistic reasoning.^[44]

Evolution [edit]

Dual-process theorists claim that System ii, a general purpose reasoning system, evolved late and worked alongside the older autonomous sub-systems of System 1.^[45] The success of Human being sapiens lends testify to their college cerebral abilities in a higher place other hominids. Mithen theorizes that the increase in cerebral ability occurred 50,000 years ago when representational art, imagery, and the design of tools and artefacts are offset documented. She hypothesizes that this alter was due to the adaptation of System 2.^[45]

Most evolutionary psychologists practice not concur with dual-process theorists. They claim that the mind is modular, and domain-specific, thus they disagree with the theory of the general reasoning ability of System ii. They have difficulty agreeing that there are ii distinct means of reasoning and that one is evolutionarily sometime, and the other is new.^[14] To ease this discomfort, the theory is that in one case Organisation 2 evolved, it became a 'long ternion' organisation without much genetic control which allowed humans to pursue their private goals.^[15]

Problems with the dual-process business relationship of reasoning [edit]

The dual-procedure account of reasoning is an old theory, as noted above. But according to Evans^[46] it has adjusted itself from the former, logicist image, to the new theories that apply to other kinds of reasoning likewise. And the theory seems more than influential now than in the by which is questionable. Evans outlined 5 "fallacies":

1. All dual-process theories are essentially the same. There is a tendency to assume all theories that propose two modes or styles of thinking are related and and so they terminate up all lumped nether the umbrella term of "dual-process theories".
2. There are just two systems underlying System 1 and System two processing. There are conspicuously more than just ii cognitive systems underlying people'southward performance on dual-processing tasks. Hence the change to theorizing that processing is done in two minds that have dissimilar evolutionary histories and that each have multiple sub-systems.
3. Organisation 1 processes are responsible for cognitive biases; Arrangement 2 processes are responsible for normatively right responding. Both System one and Organization 2 processing tin can lead to normative answers and both tin can involve cognitive biases.
4. Arrangement one processing is contextualised while System 2 processing is abstract.^[46] Contempo research has found that beliefs and context can influence Organisation 2 processing likewise as System 1.^[47]
5. Fast processing indicates the use of System one rather than System 2 processes. Just because a processing is fast does not hateful it is done past System 1. Experience and different heuristics can influence System 2 processing to become faster.^[46]

Another statement against dual-process accounts for reasoning which was outlined by Osman is that the proposed dichotomy of Organisation i and System two does not adequately adapt the range of processes accomplished.^[48] Moshman proposed that at that place should be iv possible types of processing equally opposed to 2. They would be implicit heuristic processing, implicit rule-based processing, explicit heuristic processing, and explicit dominion-based processing.^[49]
Another fine-grained division is equally follows: implicit activeness-centered processes, implicit not-activity-centered processes, explicit activeness-centered processes, and explicit not-activity-centered processes (that is, a four-way division reflecting both the implicit-explicit distinction and the procedural-declarative stardom). ^[fifty]

In response to the question as to whether in that location are dichotomous processing types, many take instead proposed a single-system framework which incorporates a continuum betwixt implicit and explicit processes.^[48]

Culling model [edit]

The dynamic graded continuum (DGC), originally proposed by Cleeremans and Jiménez is an alternative single system framework to the dual-process account of reasoning. It has non been accepted every bit better than the dual-process theory; it is instead commonly used as a comparing with which ane can evaluate the dual-process model. The DGC proposes that differences in representation generate variation in forms of reasoning without bold a multiple organization framework. It describes how graded properties of the representations that are generated while reasoning issue in the dissimilar types of reasoning. It separates terms like implicit and automatic processing where the dual-process model uses the terms interchangeably to refer to the whole of System 1. Instead the DGC uses a continuum of reasoning that moves from implicit, to explicit, to automated.^[48]

Fuzzy-trace theory [edit]

According to Charles Brainerd and Valerie Reyna'southward fuzzy-trace theory of retention and reasoning, people accept two memory representations: verbatim and gist. Verbatim is memory for surface information (e.g. the words in this judgement) whereas gist is retentiveness for semantic information (e.g. the meaning of this sentence).

This dual procedure theory posits that we encode, store, think, and forget the information in these ii traces of retentivity separately and completely independently of each other. Furthermore, the ii memory traces disuse at unlike rates: verbatim decays quickly, while gist lasts longer.

In terms of reasoning, fuzzy-trace theory posits that every bit we mature, we increasingly rely more on gist data over verbatim information. Evidence for this lies in framing experiments where framing effects go stronger when verbatim data (percentages) are replaced with gist descriptions.^[51] Other experiments dominion out predictions of prospect theory (extended and original) as well equally other electric current theories of judgment and conclusion making.^{[52] [53] [54]}

Encounter likewise [edit]

• Automatic and controlled processes
• Cerebral inhibition – The mind's ability to tune out irrelevant stimuli
• Dual process model of coping
• Dual procedure theory (moral psychology)
• Opponent-process theory – Psychological and neurological model

References [edit]

1. ^ Vaisey, Stephen (2009-05-01). "Motivation and Justification: A Dual‐Process Model of Culture in Activity". American Journal of Folklore. 114 (6): 1675–1715. CiteSeerX10.i.one.523.5365. doi:10.1086/597179. ISSN 0002-9602. PMID 19852252.
2. ^ Lizardo, Omar; Mowry, Robert; Sepulvado, Brandon; Stoltz, Dustin S.; Taylor, Marshall A.; Ness, Justin Van; Forest, Michael (2016-12-30). "What Are Dual Process Models? Implications for Cultural Analysis in Sociology". Sociological Theory. 34 (4): 287–310. doi:10.1177/0735275116675900.
3. ^ Barrett, L. F.; Tugade, 1000. K.; Engle, R. W. (2004). "Individual differences in working retentivity capacity and dual-process theories of the mind". Psychological Bulletin. 130 (4): 553–573. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.130.4.553. PMC1351135. PMID 15250813.
4. ^ Wason, P.C.; Evans, J.St.B.T. (1974). "Dual processes in reasoning?" (PDF). Noesis. iii (2): 141–154. doi:10.1016/0010-0277(74)90017-one. … or that there was at to the lowest degree some class of dual processing between beliefs and witting thought.
5. ^ Evans, Jonathan (1984). "Heuristic and analytic processes in reasoning". British Journal of Psychology. 75 (4): 451–468. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8295.1984.tb01915.x.
6. ^ Petty, Richard; Cacioppo, John (1986). The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology. Vol. 19. pp. 123–181. doi:10.1016/s0065-2601(08)60214-2. ISBN9780120152193.
7. ^ Sloman, S.A. (1996). "The empirical case for two systems of reasoning". Psychological Bulletin. 119: 3–22. CiteSeerX10.1.1.121.5355. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.119.one.3.
8. ^ Sun, R. (1994). "Integrating Rules and Connectionism for Robust Commonsense Reasoning." John Wiley and Sons, New York.
9. ^ Kahneman, D (2003). "A perspective on judgement and choice". American Psychologist. 58 (9): 697–720. CiteSeerX10.1.i.186.3636. doi:10.1037/0003-066x.58.9.697. PMID 14584987.
10. ^ Strack, Fritz; Deutsch, Roland (2004). "Reflective and Impulsive Determinants of Social Behavior". Personality and Social Psychology Review. 8 (3): 220–247. CiteSeerXx.1.1.323.2327. doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr0803_1. PMID 15454347.
11. ^ Sun, R. (2002). Duality of the Mind. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
12. ^ ^{a b c} VERMETTE, PAUL, and Cynthia Kline. GROUP Piece of work THAT WORKS: Student Collaboration for 21st Century Success. TAYLOR & FRANCIS, 2017.
13. ^ Paivio, A. (2007). Mind and its evolution: A dual coding theoretical arroyo. Mahwah, NJ. Lawrence Erlbaum Assembly.
14. ^ ^{a b c d e f grand h i} Evans, J. (2003). "In 2 minds: dual-process accounts of reasoning". Trends in Cognitive Sciences. vii (10): 454–459. CiteSeerXten.ane.one.318.3463. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2003.08.012. PMID 14550493.
15. ^ ^{a b} Stanovich, K East.; West, R F. (2000). "Individual difference in reasoning: implications for the rationality contend?". Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 23 (v): 645–726. doi:10.1017/s0140525x00003435. PMID 11301544.
16. ^ Bargh, John A. (2014). "The iv horsemen of automaticity: Sensation, intention, efficiency, and control in social cognition". In Wyer, Robert Due south., Jr.; Srull, Thomas K. (eds.). Handbook of Social Cognition (2nd ed.). Psychology Press. pp. 1–twoscore. ISBN9781317782544.
17. ^ "What is dual procedure theory?". Conceptually.org. Retrieved October 23, 2018.
18. ^ ^{a b c d} Tsujii, T.; Watanabe, Southward. (2009). "Neural correlates of dual-task upshot on belief-bias syllogistic reasoning: a near-infrared spectroscopy study". Brain Inquiry. 1287: 118–125. doi:10.1016/j.brainres.2009.06.080. PMID 19577547.
19. ^ Jonathan, St. Evans (2007). "Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and social cognition". Almanac Review of Psychology. 59: 268–269. doi:ten.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629. PMID 18154502.
20. ^ Macrae, C.North.; Bodenhausen, G.5. (2000). "Social cognition: Thinking categorically about others". Annual Review of Psychology. 51: 93–120. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.51.i.93. PMID 10751966.
21. ^ Eliot R. Smith and Jamie DeCoster (2000) Personality and Social Psychology Review. Society for Personality and Social Psychology, 119
22. ^ Devine, Patricia (1989). "Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 58: 5–18. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.56.1.5.
23. ^ Pyszczynski, T.; Greenberg, J.; Solomon, S. (1999). "A dual-process model of defense against witting and unconscious expiry-related thoughts: An extension of terror management theory". Psychological Review. 106 (4): 835–845. doi:ten.1037/0033-295x.106.4.835. PMID 10560330.
24. ^ Klein, Richard. "Many Labs four: Failure to Replicate Mortality Salience Effect With and Without Original Author Involvement". www.cos.io . Retrieved 2021-11-15 .
25. ^ Groves, P. M.; Thompson, R. F. (1970). "Habituation: A dual-process theory". Psychological Review. 77 (5): 419–450. doi:ten.1037/h0029810. PMID 4319167.
26. ^ Walker, Simon (2015). "Thinking, straight or true?". Human Ecology Education UK. Retrieved 20 October 2015.
27. ^ Addis, Donna R; Schacter, Daniel L (2012). "The Hippocampus and Imagining the Future: Where Do We Stand?". Forepart. Hum. Neurosci. 5: 173. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2011.00173. PMC3251274. PMID 22291625.
28. ^ Kumaran, Dharsan; Summerfield, Jennifer J; Hassabis, Demis; Maguire, Eleanor A (2009). "Tracking the Emergence of Conceptual Noesis during Human Decision Making". Neuron. 63 (6): 889–901. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2009.07.030. PMC2791172. PMID 19778516.
29. ^ Alos-Ferrer, C.; Strack, F. (2014). "From dual processes to multiple selves: Implications for economic behavior". Journal of Economical Psychology. 41: 1–eleven. doi:10.1016/j.joep.2013.12.005.
30. ^ Dashle, Thomas (2001). "Due south.J. Res. 23". Congress.gov. 107th Congress of the Us. Retrieved 13 May 2021.
31. ^ Greene, Joshua David (2013). Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us and Them. Penguin. p. 434. ISBN978-0-14-312605-8.
32. ^ Businesswoman, Jonathan; Scott, Sydney; Fincher, Katrina; Metz, Emlen (2015). "Why does the Cognitive Reflection Exam (sometimes) predict utilitarian moral judgment (and other things)?". Journal of Applied Inquiry in Memory and Cognition. four (three): 265-284. doi:10.1016/j.jarmac.2014.09.003.
33. ^ McPhetres, Jonathan; Conway, Paul; Hughes, Jamie S.; Zuckerman, Miron (2018). "Reflecting on God's will: Reflective processing contributes to religious peoples' deontological dilemma responses". Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 79: 301–314. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2018.08.013.
34. ^ Byrd, Nick; Conway, Paul (2019). "Non all who ponder count costs: Arithmetics reflection predicts utilitarian tendencies, but logical reflection predicts both deontological and utilitarian tendencies". Cognition. 192: 103995. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2019.06.007.
35. ^ Bago, Bence; De Neys, Wim (2018). "The intuitive greater proficient: Testing the corrective dual process model of moral knowledge". Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. 148 (10): 1782–1801. doi:10.1037/xge0000533.
36. ^ Robert J. Sternberg; Jacqueline P. Leighton (2004). The Nature of Reasoning. Cambridge University Press. p. 300. ISBN978-0-521-00928-7 . Retrieved 3 September 2013.
37. ^ Evans, Jonathan St. B. T. (Jan 2008). "Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Knowledge". Annual Review of Psychology. 59 (1): 255–278. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629. ISSN 0066-4308. PMID 18154502.
38. ^ ^{a b} De Neys, Westward. (2006). "Dual processing in reasoning: ii systems but one reasoner". Psychological Science. 17 (five): 428–433. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01723.10. JSTOR 40064560. PMID 16683931.
39. ^ ^{a b} Goel, Five.; Bruchel, C.; Frith, C.; Dolan, R. (2000). "Dissociation of mechanisms underlying syllogistic reasoning". NeuroImage. 12 (5): 504–514. doi:10.1006/nimg.2000.0636. hdl:21.11116/0000-0001-A1AC-7. PMID 11034858.
40. ^ ^{a b c} Goel, V.; Dolan, R. (2003). "Explaining modulation of reasoning by belief". Cognition. 87 (1): B11–B22. doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(02)00185-3. hdl:21.11116/0000-0001-A1A4-F. PMID 12499108.
41. ^ ^{a b c} Evans, J.St.B.T.; P. Legrenzi; V. Girotto (1999). "The influence of linguistic grade on reasoning: the case of matching bias". The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. 52 (1): 185–216. doi:10.1080/713755805.
42. ^ Friedenberg, J.; Silverman, G. (2012). Cognitive Scientific discipline (second ed.). Fifty.A.: SAGE Publications Inc. ISBN978-ane-4129-7761-6.
43. ^ Houde, O.; Zago, L.; Mellet, Due east.; Moutier, South.; Pineau, A.; Mazoyer, B.; Tzourio, North.-Mazoyer (2000). "Shifting from the perceptual brain to the logical brain: the neural impact of cognitive inhibition grooming". Periodical of Cognitive Neuroscience. 12 (five): 721–728. doi:10.1162/089892900562525.
44. ^ Stupple, East.; Waterhouse (2009). "Negations in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence for a heuristic–analytic disharmonize" (PDF). The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. 62 (8): 1533–1541. doi:10.1080/17470210902785674.
45. ^ ^{a b} Mithen, S. (2002). The Cerebral Basis of Scientific discipline. New York: Cambridge University Printing. pp. 23–40. ISBN978-0521812290.
46. ^ ^{a b c} Evans, J. (2012). "Questions and challenges for the new psychology of reasoning". Thinking & Reasoning. 18 (1): v–31. doi:ten.1080/13546783.2011.637674.
47. ^ Weidenfeld, A.; Oberauer, K.; Hornig, R. (2005). "Causal and non causal conditionals: an integrated model of interpretation and reasoning". The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. 58A (viii): 1479–1513. CiteSeerX10.1.i.163.4457. doi:x.1080/02724980443000719.
48. ^ ^{a b c} Osman, Grand. (2004). "An evaluation of dual-process theories of reasoning". Psychonomic Message & Review. xi (vi): 988–1010. doi:x.3758/bf03196730. PMID 15875969.
49. ^ Moshman, D. (2000). "Diversity in reasoning and rationality: metacognitive and developmental considerations". Behavioral and Encephalon Sciences. 23 (5): 689–690. doi:10.1017/s0140525x00483433.
50. ^ Sun, R.; Zhang, X.; Mathews, R. (2009). "Capturing human being data in a letter counting task: Accessibility and activity-centeredness in representing cognitive skills". Neural Networks. 22 (ane): fifteen–29. doi:10.1016/j.neunet.2008.08.004. PMID 18804953.
51. ^ Reyna, Valerie (2012). "A new intuitionism: Meaning, retentivity, and development in Fuzzy-Trace Theory". Judgment and Decision Making. vii (3): 332–359. PMC4268540. PMID 25530822.
52. ^ Reyna, Five.F.; Chick, C.F.; Corbin, J.C.; Hsia, A.North. (2014). "Developmental reversals in risky decision-making: Intelligence agents prove larger decision biases than college students". Psychological Scientific discipline. 25 (ane): 76–84. doi:10.1177/0956797613497022. PMC4076289. PMID 24171931.
53. ^ Reyna, V.F.; Estrada, S.M.; DeMarinis, J.A.; Myers, R.M.; Stanisz, J.M.; Mills, B.A. (2011). "Neurobiological and retentivity models of risky decision making in adolescents versus young adults". Periodical of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. 37 (5): 1125–1142. doi:10.1037/a0023943. PMID 21707215.
54. ^ Kühberger, A.; Tanner, C. (2010). "Risky pick framing: task versions and a comparison of prospect theory and fuzzy-trace theory". Periodical of Behavioral Conclusion Making. 23 (3): 314–329. doi:10.1002/bdm.656.

External links [edit]

• Laboratory for Rational Decision Making, Cornell Academy

perezformight.blogspot.com

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual_process_theory

Share this post